This book examines the criticisms that Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d. 1248)
directed at Avicenna’s (d. 1037) logic, taking Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār
ʿan ghawāmiḍ al-afkār as its principal source. Its central thesis is that
Khūnajī’s relation to Avicenna cannot be described as mere criticism or
mere defence; it should be read as a form of critical allegiance. While
Khūnajī questions Avicenna’s definitions and proofs, he also defends
him against the objections of critics such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and
Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī. The book follows this relation across three
domains. The first chapter deals with conceptions: the distinction between
conception and assent, the subject matter of logic, signification
and utterance, the five universals and definition. The second chapter
examines the theory of propositions, modality, contradiction, conversion,
contraposition and conditional propositions. The third chapter
turns to the definition of the syllogism, the syllogism of equality, the
fourth figure, modal mixes (mukhtalitāt) and conditional syllogisms. In
each topic Avicenna’s view is presented first, followed by Khūnajī’s objection
or interpretation, on the basis of the primary sources.
Keywords: Khūnajī; Avicenna; Kashf al-asrār; History of Islamic Logic;
Syllogistic Theory; Modal Logic; Conditional Propositions