In this study, which examines, through the lens of the teleological argument,
the possibility and limits of forming a conception of God on the
basis of empirical knowledge, we sought to make visible how changes
in scientific and philosophical paradigms over the course of history not
only affected the way the teleological argument was formulated but
also shaped perspectives on its epistemic value. Accordingly, we first
addressed the debates within the Aristotelian philosophical tradition
concerning the epistemic value of theistic demonstrations that, like the
teleological argument, proceed from effect to cause. We sought to show
that while Aristotle’s teleological conception of nature lends legitimacy
to the argument, his theory of demonstration in the Posterior Analytics
restricts such inferences. After examining the positions of al-Fārābī
and Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), which relegated the argument to a secondary
place with respect to its epistemic value, we explored the approaches
of Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and Thomas Aquinas, who defended it as an
independent demonstration. We then evaluated the objections raised
against the teleological argument by David Hume and Immanuel Kant
in the early modern period, when the teleological conception of nature
began to yield to the notion of necessary law and a mechanistic view of
the universe. We argued that Hume’s critique of causality, undermines
not only the teleological argument but also the empiricist conception
of scientific method that he himself endorsed. Therefore, gives rise to
an inconsistency. On the other hand Kant’s critique of the physico-theological
proof targets the nature of the principle reached rather than
the validity of the inference grounded in experience. Finally, we investigated
in what direction and how the ground of the debate on the teleological
argument shifted in the modern and contemporary periods. In
this context, we treated the debates on evolution, intelligent design, and
fine-tuning as contemporary manifestations of the question of whether
the existence of God can be reached from the observed phenomenon
of regularity. We emphasized that in these debates, in which rival hypotheses
are compared, William A. Dembski and Michael J. Behe confine
themselves to inferring the existence of an agent, whereas Richard
Swinburne and Robin Collins associate the phenomenon of regularity
with the God of theism. Thus, we concluded that although the way the
argument is formulated and the epistemic value accorded to it vary as
paradigms change, the tension generated by the effort to reach a principle
that transcends experience by proceeding from experience has
persisted in every period.
Keywords: Teleology; God; Theism; Design; Order; Purpose; Evolution;
Intelligent Design; Fine-Tuning